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Commissioner
v. Lundy:
TAX COURT
LACKS
JURISDICTION
TO AWARD
REFUND OF TAXES
PAID MORE THAN
TWO YEARS PRIOR
TO MAILING OF
NOTICE OF
DEFICIENCY TO
DELINQUENT
TAXPA YER.
In Commissioner v.
Lundy, 116 S. Ct. 647 (1996),
the United States Supreme
Court held that the Tax Court
lacks jurisdiction to award a
refund of taxes paid more than
two years prior to the mailing of
a notice of deficiency to a delin-
quent taxpayer. The Court an-
alyzed section 6511 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, 26 U. S.C.,
governing the time for filing a
refund claim, and determined
that a two-year, rather than a
three-year "look-back" period,
applies when the taxpayer has
not filed a return by the time a
notice of deficiency is sent by
the IRS. In so holding, the
Supreme Court established a
uniform interpretation of sec-
tion 6511, resolving the exist-
ing conflict among the circuits.
During 1987, respon-
dent Robert F. Lundy and his
wife ("Lundys") had more in-
come withheld from their wag-
es than they actually owed in
taxes. The Lundys, however,
failed to file a tax return that
year. On September 26, 1990,
the Commissioner of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service ("Com-
missioner") mailed the Lundys
a notice that they owed addi-
tional taxes and interest for that
year and that they were liable
for delinquent filing and negli-
gent underpayment of taxes.
The Lundys filed their 1987 tax
return on December 22, 1990,
claiming that they did not un-
derpay their taxes, but rather
that they were entitled to a
$3,537 refund. Two days after
the return was mailed, the
Lundys filed a petition for the
refund in the Tax Court.
The Commissioner con-
tended that the Tax Court lacked
jurisdiction to award the Lundys
a refund. The Tax Court held
that if the taxpayer failed to file
a return by the time the Com-
missioner sends a notice of de-
ficiency and the notice is sent
more than two years after the
taxes were paid, section 6511
establishes a look-back period
of two years. Thus, the Tax
Court held that it lacked juris-
diction to award a refund of
taxes paid more than two years
before the claim was filed. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed, holding that
section 6511 established athree-
year, rather than a two-year,
look-back period. The Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of sec-
tion 6511 was contrary to the
interpretation of every other
court of appeals that had ad-
dressed the issue. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the conflict.
The Court began its
analysis by distinguishing the
jurisdictional requirements for
refund suits in the United States
District Courts and Court of
Federal Claims from the juris-
dictional requirements for re-
fund suits in the Tax Court.
Lundy, 116 S. Ct. at 651. The
Court noted that in the district
courts and the Court of Federal
Claims, the taxpayer must file a
claim for a refund within two
years from the time the tax was
paid. Id. The Tax Court juris-
diction, however, is only limit-
ed by the look-back period and
the taxpayer seeking a refund
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need only show that the pay-
ment in question was made
within that period. Id. The
majority analyzed sections
6511 -12 which instruct the Tax
Court to apply either a three-
year or a two-year look-back
period. Id. at 651-52. The
Court determined that when no
return is filed by the taxpayer,
there is no date from which to
measure the three-year look-
back period described in sec-
tion 6511(a). Id. Thus, the
applicable look-back period is
the default two-year period
described in section
6511 (b)(2)(B), which is mea-
sured from the date the notice
of deficiency is mailed. Id. The
majority concluded that the ef-
fect of sections 6511-12 is to
afford the taxpayer who timely
files a return the three-year pe-
riod to contest the accuracy of a
previously filed tax return, while
allowing the delinquent taxpay-
er the more limited two-year
look-back period. Id. at 652-
53. The Court noted that under
the Fourth Circuit's rule, the
timely filer, rather than the de-
linquent one, would be subject-
ed to the shorter limitation peri-
od in the Tax Court, a result that
Congress could not have in-
tended. Id. at 654. Thus, the
Court concluded that the Fourth
Circuit interpretation ofthe stat-
ute was incorrect. Id.
The Court next analyzed
respondent's three supporting
arguments. Id. Respondent
first argued that because the
only way to file a claim for a
refund with the IRS is by filing
atax return, Congress must have
intended the word "claim" in
section 6512(b)(3)(B) to mean
a claim filed in a tax return. Id.
Respondent, thus, argued that
section 6512 established a uni-
form three-year look-back pe-
riod for the Tax Court. Id. The
Court examined the language
of section 6512 and found that
the word "claim" in the statute
was not susceptible to respon-
dent's interpretation. The ma-
jority noted that the language
itself suggests that a claim for a
refund may be filed separately
from the return by requiring
that the claim be filed "within 3
years from the time the return
was filed." Id. (quoting 26
U.S.C. § 6512(b)(3)(B)(1995)).
Respondent then argued
that the application of a two-
year look-back period was con-
trary to Congress' purpose in
drafting section 6512(b)(3)(B)
which was to uphold a taxpay-
er's claim to a refund in the Tax
Court. Id. at 655-56. TheCourt
addressed respondent's second
argument by noting that Con-
gress could not have intended
section 6512(b)(3)(B) to always
preserve the taxpayer's claim
to a refund. Id. at 656. The
Court noted that by including a
two-year and a three-year look-
back period Congress must have
intended section 6512(b)(3)(B)
to act as a bar against recovery
under some circumstances. Id.
Respondent finally ar-
gued that the Court's interpre-
tation of the statute would re-
sult in inconsistencies in the
limitation period applicable in
the district court and the Court
of Federal Claims and the Tax
Court. Id. The Court addressed
this argument by noting that it
was bound by the plain lan-
guage of the statute and that the
incongruence created was no
excuse to change the scheme
that Congress had chosen to
craft. Id. The Court concluded
that application of section
6512(b)(3)(B) to the facts of the
case required the use of a two-
year look-back period and that
the Tax Court correctly held
that it lackedjurisdictionto grant
a refund. Id. at 657.
In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Stevens argued that the
statutory history of section
6512(b) indicates that Congress
drafted the section to protect
the taxpayer who receives a no-
tice of deficiency from missing
the time to amend the return
and file for a refund before the
litigation is over. Id. Justice
Stevens concluded that it did
not make sense to take a statute
designed to help the taxpayer
who gets an unexpected notice
of deficiency from the IRS and
use it to shorten the taxpayer's
period to file for a refund. Id
Justice Thomas, joined
by Justice Stevens, argued in
his dissenting opinion that un-
der the IRS's longstanding in-
terpretation of section 6511 the
Lundys would have recovered
their refund had they filed suit
in district court. Id. Justice
Thomas argued that nothing in
section 65 12(b)(3)(B) suggests
that Congress intended to short-
en the filing period for the Tax
Court and, thus, a three-year
look-back period should have
been applied. Id.
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In Commissioner v.
Lundy, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the Tax
Court lacksjurisdictionto award
a refund oftaxes paid more than
two years prior to the mailing of
a notice of deficiency to a delin-
quent taxpayer. While Justice
Thomas's analysis of the statu-
tory history of sections 6511-
12 provides a compelling alter-
native interpretation of the stat-
ute, a careful examination of
Congress's intent in drafting
sections 6511-12 inescapably
leads to the conclusion that the
majority's interpretation of the
statute is the preferred one. In
so holding, the Court rejected
the Fourth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of sections 6511-12 of the
Internal Revenue Code and re-
solved the existing conflict of
interpretation among all the
Courts of Appeals.
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SUSQUEHANNA LOCKHOUSE 1840
This two-story brick structure was built on the Susquehanna River at Havre de Grace, Maryland.
It was the office for collecting tolls for vessels that once travelled north through the Susquehanna
& Tidewater Canal. A simple building, which was also the home for the locktender, it stands
behind the original outlet lock and reconstructed pivot bridge.
48- U. Bait. L.F. /26.3
